هل يمكن أن يُحدث الحرب في أوكرانيا تغييراً سياسياً لروسيا؟

Volodymyr Zelensky recently suggested that the war in Ukraine was beginning to turn in his country’s favour. The Ukrainian president insisted that Russia was “losing the initiative each day”.

These comments came days after Zelensky wrote an open letter to his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in which he called for direct talks to end the war. Zelensky concluded the letter by stating: “when Russia grows tired, change comes”.

There is truth to Zelensky’s claim. As journalist Gideon Rachman pointed out recently in the Financial Times, Russia has experienced dramatic political change four times in the past 100 years or so after defeat in a war or a serious foreign policy miscalculation.

The 1905 revolution that led to the imposition of limits on the power of the ruling Tsars was sparked by Russia’s humiliating loss in the Russo-Japanese war. The Bolsheviks then came to power in 1917, laying the foundations for the Soviet Union, after Russia’s disastrous military performance in the first world war.

Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 brought the world to the brink of disaster and convinced other leading figures in the Kremlin that he had to go. And in 1991, just two years after withdrawing Soviet troops from Moscow’s failed war in Afghanistan, Mikhail Gorbachev faced an attempted coup that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

Public humiliation on the world stage was an important element in each of these cases. It focused attention on Moscow’s weaknesses, demonstrating that Russia was not as strong as it appeared. This display of weakness emboldened those who wanted change.

But more was needed. A real sense of hardship and grievance experienced by society or political elites – or both – was necessary to deepen and broaden that desire for change and provide an impetus for action. The leaders of political change also had opportunities to organise, gain support and establish a power base.

So, will the war in Ukraine cost Putin his position as Russia’s leader? Some signs point in that direction. The war is increasingly becoming a public humiliation for Russia. When the so-called “special military operation” began in February 2022, Russian officers leading the invasion were told to pack dress uniforms to wear in a victory parade in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv.

But more than four years later, Russia is struggling to achieve its far more limited goal of taking and holding the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. During 2026, Russia’s rate of advance has slowed to a crawl and has even been reversed in some places. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s effective use of drones has given Kyiv the initiative.

There are now signs that the Russian government realises it cannot achieve its war aims in Ukraine. In May, a leaked document revealed that the Kremlin is making plans for a propaganda campaign to spin the war in a way that avoids conceding that none of its stated goals have been fulfilled.

The war is also unpopular among ordinary Russians. An April opinion poll, which was carried out by Russia’s Levada Center, showed 62% of Russians want the war to end. The poll found that only 27% of Russians favour continuing it.

Considering the pressure to give “the right” responses in such surveys out of fear of retribution from the state, it is remarkable that such a high proportion of those surveyed were willing to express dissatisfaction with the war. It also suggests that the true extent of war weariness among Russians could be even greater.

This desire for an end to the war may stem from the fact that the conflict is becoming increasingly real to Russians. While economic sanctions against Russia have been an inconvenience to most citizens, Ukraine’s ability to manufacture drones that can strike deep in Russian territory is truly bringing the war home. Russian oil refineries and depots have been particular targets, driving up prices and creating shortages and petrol rationing in several regions.

Limited signs of change

However, while there is a widespread desire among Russians for the war to end, there are no signs of mass protests that might put pressure on the state to end the war quickly or, indeed, bring about real political change.

Legislation rushed through days after the start of the mass invasion of Ukraine made it an offence to spread “false information” about the military or “discredit” the armed forces. And although some individuals continue to protest as “single pickets”, most Russians are discouraged from taking a public stance by the prospect of arrest and fines or custodial sentences.

Another factor that prevents large-scale protests or uprisings in Russia is the absence of any political opposition to the state. Russia’s remaining prominent opposition leaders are either in exile or in prison. The state also makes extensive use of legislation that allows it to declare individuals, organisations or groups that are critical of the state as “foreign agents” or “undesirable organisations”.

Those who are designated foreign agents face financial penalties and lose a number of legal rights, including the right to stand for election. Undesirable organisations face even harsher restrictions. They are not permitted to conduct financial transactions or spread information in the media or on the internet.

The extent of legal restrictions on society and opposition figures mean that political change is most likely to come from inside the ruling regime. This happened in 1964 when Khrushchev was removed from power. A group of fellow political leaders confronted Khrushchev, who agreed to step aside when he found that no powerful institutions were willing to support him.

Putin is well aware of this precedent and has been careful to avoid naming a successor. He has also been very effective at keeping the various competing interests in Russian politics at odds with each other while ensuring that the country’s intelligence and security forces are loyal to him personally.

The obstacles to a coup are significant. But if Putin continues his refusal to consider making any concessions to end the war in Ukraine, those who surround him might decide that their own interests are better served by removing him from power.

Jennifer Mathers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.