أراد بوتين أن يجعل روسيا عظيمة مرة أخرى. وبدلاً من ذلك، أصبحت أوكرانيا القوة الصاعدة الجديدة في أوروبا

Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine is often, and misleadingly, characterised as a great power conflict.

The narrative goes like this: Russia went to war against Ukraine because it felt threatened by NATO’s enlargement into eastern Europe after 1991. The real enemy is the United States, which is, at the very least, “principally responsible” for the war.

This interpretation follows Kremlin talking points. It takes the logic of the Cold War and drops it into a fundamentally different present-day world. It has been debunked both by political scientists and historians.

In reality, Russia’s war is the opposite of a great power conflict. It is a confrontation between middle powers. The great powers – the United States and China – are acting from the sidelines.

A great power no more

Russia has not been a great power since the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1989–1991. As I discuss in my newly updated book, Russia’s War Against Ukraine, Russia is a middle power with a great power complex.

It has successfully usurped Soviet great-power legacies, including its permanent seat on the UN Security Council and one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals. It has also projected a vision of itself as a world leader, which has gained some traction with conservatives in the global north and critics of US hegemony in the global south.

But it can no longer back up these claims. Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) is only slightly bigger than South Korea’s, and smaller than Canada’s or Brazil’s.

It still has one of the world’s largest militaries, with an estimated 1.1 million active-duty personnel. But in order to maintain it, Russia had to devote 7.5% of its economy – or US$190 billion – to military spending in 2025.

Meanwhile, the oft-decried underspending of Europe’s NATO members, none of whom spend more than 4.5% of GDP, added up to nearly three times as much: US$559 billion.

Russian President Vladimir Putin went to war to reverse this reality and make Russia great again. But Russia’s army failed to overwhelm Ukraine’s army in the war, even though Kyiv has just 880,000 active-duty personnel (other estimates vary) .

Four and a half years after the full-scale invasion, Russia has suffered a functional defeat in Ukraine. About 80% of Ukraine remains in Ukrainian hands behind a largely static front line. Moscow has now been reduced to conducting an air assault against civilians, a criminal strategy of desperation with few historical examples of success.

Its international influence is also waning. Since 2022, Russia has lost carefully cultivated allies in Syria, Venezuela and Hungary. Europe, once a lucrative market for Russian hydrocarbons, has turned hostile for the long term.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has risen from a minor power on the outskirts of Europe to a diplomatic and military middle power at the continent’s heart.

While still financially dependent on Europe, it is now a world leader in the production of drones. President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent “drone diplomacy” in the Middle East – which culminated in ten-year deals with three countries – further demonstrated a country punching well above its weight.

Ukraine is also playing a central role in Europe’s ongoing self-assertion – and this week, took an important step forward in joining the European Union.

Why the great powers have distanced themselves

This war, then, is a war between middle powers, not a proxy conflict between great powers. It cannot be construed as some great game over “Eurasia”.

Neither China nor the US wanted a war in Europe this century. China remains focused on Taiwan, while the US has been trying to come to terms with a disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan and its concerns over China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific. Throughout the escalating crisis Russia manufactured in the second half of 2021, the Biden administration tried to deescalate, create diplomatic off-ramps, and spoil Russian war plans by making them public.

After the full-scale invasion in early 2022, China and the US remained wary of elevating Putin’s war to a great power conflict.

China took advantage of incredibly cheap Russian energy supplies and markets now deserted by European or US exports. It became “the decisive enabler” of Russia’s war, hoping to distract the US from Asia.

But Beijing was careful not to deliver weapons to Russia. It also took a public stance against nuclear escalation and affirmed “the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of all countries involved.

More importantly, China never sanctioned Ukraine, which is dependent on Chinese-produced parts and materials for its growing drone industry.

The United States, meanwhile, has hesitated in its support of Ukraine.

Originally, US intelligence officials assumed Russia would win the war within days. As Ukraine survived, mostly because of its own arsenals, the Biden administration began supporting it, albeit with caveats. The weapons it sent came with strings attached and deliveries were often delayed for fear of crossing some Russian red line or other.

This war was even more inconvenient for the United States than it was for China. This sentiment has only intensified under the Trump administration. As the US has pulled back, a flexible coalition of democratic middle powers has stepped up to help Ukraine.

What we see happening in Ukraine, then, is the realignment of the world system from a US-dominated global order after 1991 to a multi-polar world. In this world, middle powers are playing a much larger role than during either the Cold War or its aftermath.

The leaders of middle powers like Australia and Canada are in the process of waking up to this reality.

US President Donald Trump, by contrast, has not yet understood this state of affairs. Even if he might now return his attention to this war, he will find he has fewer cards to play than he thought.

Mark Edele receives funding from the Australian Research Council.