Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz and Israel’s right to defend itself against Hezbollah’s rocket attacks have boxed the US president into a corner.
伊朗控制霍尔木兹海峡，以及以色列应对真主党火箭袭击的权利，将美国总统逼入了进退两难的境地。
The world sighed in relief when Donald Trump agreed to a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to finally end the conflict with Iran on June 17. But there is now a palpable feeling that hostilities are far from over. The agreement between Washington and Tehran, signed at Versailles on June 18, is better understood as a deferred crisis – one whose contradictions are already visible.
当唐纳德·特朗普同意于6月17日签署谅解备忘录（MoU），最终结束与伊朗的冲突时，世界松了一口气。但现在弥漫着一种明显的感受：敌对行动远未结束。华盛顿和德黑兰于6月18日在凡尔赛签署的协议，最好被理解为一场延期的危机——其矛盾早已显现。
Iran’s closure of the waterway since February has caused one of the largest supply disruptions in the history of global energy markets, driving inflation across the western world and aggravating American motorists at the gas station. It was this economic stranglehold that brought Trump to the table.
伊朗自二月以来关闭水道，造成了全球能源市场历史上最大的供应中断之一，推高了西方世界的通胀，并让美国驾车者在加油站感到困扰。正是这种经济上的扼制，将特朗普带到了谈判桌前。
The payoff for the US is unclear. As former US president Barack Obama recently said, it is “doubtful that any agreement that arises is going to be significantly different, or represent a significant improvement from the deal” that Obama himself oversaw in 2015.
对美国的收益尚不明确。正如前美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马最近所说，任何产生的协议“不太可能与他自己在2015年监督的协议有显著不同，或代表着重大的改进”。
Iran’s closure of the strait gave it the leverage to secure concessions from Trump – potentially exceeding the Obama-era nuclear deal – without offering more on the nuclear question than it had tabled in Geneva days before the war began in February. Even senior Republicans such as Senator Bill Cassidy have lamented the deal for its financial incentives to the Iranian regime.
伊朗关闭了海峡，使其获得了向特朗普争取让步的筹码——这些让步可能超过奥巴马时代的核协议——但它在核问题上提供的条件，并没有比它在二月战争爆发前几天在日内瓦提出的更多。甚至连参议员比尔·卡西迪等高级共和党人也对该协议对其向伊朗政权提供的经济激励表示了担忧。
Within 72 hours of the MoU, Iran’s military command claimed to have closed the Strait of Hormuz once again. This was no surprise. It is indicative of an emboldened Iran that is flexing its leverage – leverage Trump’s deal has inadvertently produced.
在谅解备忘录签署后的72小时内，伊朗军事指挥部声称再次关闭了霍尔木兹海峡。这并不令人惊讶。它表明了一个胆大起来的伊朗，正在挥舞其筹码——而特朗普的协议无意中制造了这种筹码。
Iran has absorbed enormous punishment, survived and is now dictating the terms of the ceasefire by dangling the constant threat of economic misery in front of Trump’s face. This is not a foundation for a stable settlement. In fact, it signals a serious loss of control for both the US and Israel.
伊朗承受了巨大的打击，幸存下来，现在正通过悬挂经济困苦的持续威胁，来主导对停火条款的制定，并将其摆在特朗普面前。这不能成为一个稳定解决方案的基础。事实上，它标志着美国和以色列双方都失去了严重的控制力。
Iran’s justification – Israeli strikes against Hezbollah – for wreaking economic havoc and holding global energy markets hostage illustrates the structural flaw at the heart of Trump’s approach to deal-making. Iranian officials have explicitly said that the “most important item” on their agenda is preventing further Israeli strikes in Lebanon.
伊朗以“以色列袭击真主党”为由进行破坏经济和将全球能源市场作为人质的行为，揭示了特朗普处理协议的核心结构性缺陷。伊朗官员明确表示，他们议程上“最重要的问题”是阻止以色列在黎巴嫩进一步发动袭击。
Iran’s strategic logic is unambiguous. Every time Israel retaliates against Hezbollah, which it is both legally entitled and politically compelled to do, Iran holds the global economy hostage via the Strait of Hormuz.
伊朗的战略逻辑是明确的。每当以色列对真主党进行报复时——这是它法律上有权且政治上被迫做的事情——伊朗就通过霍尔木兹海峡将全球经济作为人质。
This places Israel in an impossible position. It cannot permanently suspend its right to self-defence as a condition of a US diplomatic agreement. It is hard to see Israel’s security cabinet accepting a framework in which Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon can attack their territory with impunity, because the consequences of retaliation lead to increased pressure on global oil markets and American inflation figures.
这使以色列处于一个不可能的位置。它不能以美国外交协议的条件，永久暂停其自卫权。很难看到以色列的安全内阁接受这样一个框架：即在黎巴嫩由伊朗支持的力量可以逍遥法外地攻击其领土，因为报复的后果会导致全球石油市场和美国通胀数据的压力增加。
As Israel’s minister of national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir put it: “Israel is not subject to the United States, and we are an independent and sovereign nation.”
作为以色列国家安全部长，伊塔马尔·本-格维尔说：“以色列不服从美国，我们是一个独立主权国家。”
This is not a viable and sustainable strategy of deterrence. It is brass-necked coercion dressed up as diplomacy.
这并非一种可行且可持续的威慑战略。它不过是披着外交外衣的强硬胁迫。
For Trump, the domestic arithmetic is equally unstable. While he insists that his deal has delivered everything it set out to achieve, by his own admission, he also stated at the recent G7 summit in France that he “didn’t want to see an economic catastrophe”. It would certainly not improve his party’s prospects in the upcoming midterm elections in November.
对于特朗普来说，国内的算计同样不稳定。虽然他坚持认为他的协议已经实现了所有目标，但根据他自己的承认，他在最近于法国举行的G7峰会上也表示，他“不想看到经济灾难”。这肯定不会改善其党派在今年11月中期选举中的前景。
It is a frank acknowledgement that his decision-making was driven by the perception that continued military pressure was producing diminishing returns. The decision to stop fighting had ceased to be a strategic choice. It was the result of an American president who no longer believed he could act with complete control.
这是一个坦诚的承认：他的决策是出于一种认知——持续的军事压力正在产生边际效益递减。停止战斗的决定已经不再是一个战略选择。它是美国总统无法再相信自己能够完全掌控局势的结果。
The problem is that the deal does not restore that agency in a meaningful way. Iran has now demonstrated to itself, to its regional partners, and to the world that it can act belligerently and still negotiate from a position of strength.
伊朗现在向自身、区域伙伴和全世界展示了，它可以在采取好战姿态的同时，还能从优势地位进行谈判。
Vicious cycle
恶性循环
What is currently happening can be best described as a cycle: Israeli military action in Lebanon, Iranian threats to close the strait, US pressure on Israel to stand down, and Israeli resistance to doing so. Each iteration of this cycle will intensify the narrative that restraint is no longer a viable course of action – for Israel, for Trump’s domestic base, and for the Gulf states who have felt the brunt of Iranian drone attacks.
目前发生的情况最好被描述为一个周期：以色列在黎巴嫩的军事行动、伊朗威胁封锁海峡、美国向以色列施压要求停战，以及以色列抵制停战。这个周期的每一次迭代都会加剧一种叙事——即克制不再是可行的选择，这对于以色列、特朗普在国内的支持基础，以及感受到伊朗无人机袭击重创的海湾国家而言都是如此。
Despite the destruction of most of Iran’s military capabilities, infrastructure and political leadership, Iran remains determined to change the order of things in its region. Its foreign policy behaviour is driven by a combination of revolutionary ideology, a deep mistrust of the US, and a religiously guided identity as a self-appointed protector of the Shia Islamic world.
尽管伊朗的大部分军事能力、基础设施和政治领导层都遭受了破坏，但伊朗仍然决心改变其地区格局。其外交政策行为由革命意识形态、对美国的深刻不信任，以及作为自封的什叶派伊斯兰世界保护者的宗教指导身份这几方面共同驱动。
Nothing in the last four months has given Tehran reason to revise that worldview. Quite the contrary.
过去四个月内，没有任何事情给德黑兰提供了修改这种世界观的理由。恰恰相反。
Lebanon has become the fault line on which this deal will either hold or break. Israel has understood this from the start. Trump is catching up. His threat to “blow the shit out of them” if Iran does not comply suggests a president whose patience with his own agreement is already fraying.
黎巴嫩已成为决定这项协议是维持还是破裂的断层线。以色列从一开始就理解这一点。特朗普正在逐渐意识到这一点。他威胁说，如果伊朗不服从，就要“把他们炸个稀烂”，这表明他对自身协议的耐心已经开始消退。
The memorandum of understanding is a ceasefire with a built-in detonator. When political actors come to believe that restraint no longer allows them to act meaningfully – as both Trump and Israel increasingly do – escalation ceases to be a choice. It may come to be the only available logic.
这份谅解备忘录是一场内置了引信的停火协议。当政治参与者相信克制不再能让他们有意义地行动时——正如特朗普和以色列越来越相信的那样——升级就不能再是一个选择。它可能会成为唯一可行的逻辑。
Ben Soodavar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
本·苏达瓦尔（Ben Soodavar）不为任何受益于本文的公司或组织工作、咨询、拥有股份或接受资金，并且除了其学术任职外，没有披露任何相关隶属关系。
