العيوب الجوهرية في صفقة وقف إطلاق النار الإيرانية لدونالد ترامب

The world sighed in relief when Donald Trump agreed to a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to finally end the conflict with Iran on June 17. But there is now a palpable feeling that hostilities are far from over. The agreement between Washington and Tehran, signed at Versailles on June 18, is better understood as a deferred crisis – one whose contradictions are already visible.

Iran’s closure of the waterway since February has caused one of the largest supply disruptions in the history of global energy markets, driving inflation across the western world and aggravating American motorists at the gas station. It was this economic stranglehold that brought Trump to the table.

The payoff for the US is unclear. As former US president Barack Obama recently said, it is “doubtful that any agreement that arises is going to be significantly different, or represent a significant improvement from the deal” that Obama himself oversaw in 2015.

Iran’s closure of the strait gave it the leverage to secure concessions from Trump – potentially exceeding the Obama-era nuclear deal – without offering more on the nuclear question than it had tabled in Geneva days before the war began in February. Even senior Republicans such as Senator Bill Cassidy have lamented the deal for its financial incentives to the Iranian regime.

Within 72 hours of the MoU, Iran’s military command claimed to have closed the Strait of Hormuz once again. This was no surprise. It is indicative of an emboldened Iran that is flexing its leverage – leverage Trump’s deal has inadvertently produced.

Iran has absorbed enormous punishment, survived and is now dictating the terms of the ceasefire by dangling the constant threat of economic misery in front of Trump’s face. This is not a foundation for a stable settlement. In fact, it signals a serious loss of control for both the US and Israel.

Iran’s justification – Israeli strikes against Hezbollah – for wreaking economic havoc and holding global energy markets hostage illustrates the structural flaw at the heart of Trump’s approach to deal-making. Iranian officials have explicitly said that the “most important item” on their agenda is preventing further Israeli strikes in Lebanon.

Iran’s strategic logic is unambiguous. Every time Israel retaliates against Hezbollah, which it is both legally entitled and politically compelled to do, Iran holds the global economy hostage via the Strait of Hormuz.

This places Israel in an impossible position. It cannot permanently suspend its right to self-defence as a condition of a US diplomatic agreement. It is hard to see Israel’s security cabinet accepting a framework in which Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon can attack their territory with impunity, because the consequences of retaliation lead to increased pressure on global oil markets and American inflation figures.

As Israel’s minister of national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir put it: “Israel is not subject to the United States, and we are an independent and sovereign nation.”

This is not a viable and sustainable strategy of deterrence. It is brass-necked coercion dressed up as diplomacy.

For Trump, the domestic arithmetic is equally unstable. While he insists that his deal has delivered everything it set out to achieve, by his own admission, he also stated at the recent G7 summit in France that he “didn’t want to see an economic catastrophe”. It would certainly not improve his party’s prospects in the upcoming midterm elections in November.

It is a frank acknowledgement that his decision-making was driven by the perception that continued military pressure was producing diminishing returns. The decision to stop fighting had ceased to be a strategic choice. It was the result of an American president who no longer believed he could act with complete control.

The problem is that the deal does not restore that agency in a meaningful way. Iran has now demonstrated to itself, to its regional partners, and to the world that it can act belligerently and still negotiate from a position of strength.

Vicious cycle

What is currently happening can be best described as a cycle: Israeli military action in Lebanon, Iranian threats to close the strait, US pressure on Israel to stand down, and Israeli resistance to doing so. Each iteration of this cycle will intensify the narrative that restraint is no longer a viable course of action – for Israel, for Trump’s domestic base, and for the Gulf states who have felt the brunt of Iranian drone attacks.

Despite the destruction of most of Iran’s military capabilities, infrastructure and political leadership, Iran remains determined to change the order of things in its region. Its foreign policy behaviour is driven by a combination of revolutionary ideology, a deep mistrust of the US, and a religiously guided identity as a self-appointed protector of the Shia Islamic world.

Nothing in the last four months has given Tehran reason to revise that worldview. Quite the contrary.

Lebanon has become the fault line on which this deal will either hold or break. Israel has understood this from the start. Trump is catching up. His threat to “blow the shit out of them” if Iran does not comply suggests a president whose patience with his own agreement is already fraying.

The memorandum of understanding is a ceasefire with a built-in detonator. When political actors come to believe that restraint no longer allows them to act meaningfully – as both Trump and Israel increasingly do – escalation ceases to be a choice. It may come to be the only available logic.

Ben Soodavar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.