在哥伦比亚和巴西，总统候选人提出的解决方案只是应对旧问题的旧方案。

On May 31st, Colombian voters will go to the polls with Abelardo de la Espriella – criminal lawyer, self-styled outsider, and self-described “Tiger” – securing his place in the runoff against left-wing Iván Cepeda. In Brazil, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro – the son of incarcerated former President Jair Bolsonaro – is also busy, touring Washington, Dallas, and El Salvador, burnishing a “Bolsonaro 2.0” brand ahead of October elections.

The two men have never appeared on the same stage, but they are running similar campaigns, reading from similar scripts, and looking toward the same set of foreign role models. In a familiar recipe, their platforms combine free-market economics, conservative values, and a tough approach to crime.

De la Espriella proposes reducing the size of the state by up to 40%, eliminating hundreds of thousands of public contracts and positions, and slashing taxes. He considers himself a major political admirer of Argentina’s President Javier Milei, someone who, in his eyes, has charted the solution to the hemisphere’s economic problems.

Flávio Bolsonaro has presented his pre-candidacy as a direct continuation of the legacy of his father, who was arrested last year for attempting a coup d’état following his defeat in the 2022 elections. Bolsonaro’s oldest son describes his project as the return to a market-oriented, Pro-Washington, and nationalistic platform.

Economy, security, and foreign policy

Although the language varies at times, the ideology that drives both campaigns does not. Both Bolsonaro’s son and De la Espriella embrace a combination of right-wing conservative security stances and the same neoliberal economic doctrine that was tried across Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, showcasing a repacking of old views to try and solve old problems.

On security, both candidates have vowed to follow the steps of El Savador’s strongman president Nayib Bukele. Flávio Bolsonaro, after visiting El Salvador’s notorious CECOT mega-prison in person, called Bukele’s approach a “radical transformation” and demanded the construction of “many, many prisons” in Brazil to address a deficit he estimates at 500,000 beds.

De la Espriella is even more explicit: “Against the narcoterrorism that Petro has coddled, an iron fist like Bukele’s,” he has declared, promising to bomb guerrilla encampments and build high-security mega-prisons modeled on El Salvador’s CECOT. He also proposes a new prison corps staffed by military reservists and veterans, administered privately, removing the current penal institute which he describes as “a cancer for Colombia.”

On foreign policy, De la Espriella has declared that any relationship Colombia has with Venezuela must be conducted “through the United States”, essentially ignoring the Venezuelan Government. This is a remarkable formulation that would break tradition with previous Colombian foreign policy towards Caracas, which was marked by acting mostly in an independent fashion of its allies in the region. He wants to strengthen the military alliance with Washington and Tel Aviv, and has called on the Trump Administration to prosecute and extradite incumbent President Gustavo Petro over supposed drug charges.

Flávio Bolsonaro, meanwhile, appeared at CPAC in Dallas, supporting the alliance with President Trump. He openly positioned Brazil as a bulwark in Washington’s geopolitical strategy to reduce Chinese influence in the hemisphere and offered up his country’s strategic resources to this end. Trump’s own political adviser, Jason Miller, declared Flávio the “next president” of Brazil from the conference stage.

What is striking about all of this is not just the content of these proposals but their explicitly transnational character. As they aim for the Presidency, De la Espriella and Flávio Bolsonaro are aiming for membership in a global conservative movement, constructing their political identities by association with leaders like Trump, Bukele, and Milei.

How far can their promises go?

This transnational strategy, however, has already shown some limits. When Eduardo Bolsonaro lobbied Washington to impose tariffs and sanctions on Brazil’s government and economy, 57% of Brazilians disapproved of what he was doing to their country. Instead of strengthening the Bolsonaro brand, this episode handed left-wing president Lula Da Silva a nationalist narrative that the right had monopolized for years. All while presidents Lula and Trump would go on to partially reconcile not that long after.

“Bukelizing” security can also be problematic. Importing the Salvadoran model to much bigger countries, whose public security issues are complex and widespread, would be an invitation to the kind of arbitrary State power that Colombian and Brazilian democracies spent decades trying to contain. By tapping into Bukele’s youthful appeal and increasing popularity, Bolsonaro and De la Espriella vow to promote potentially authoritarian solutions under a veil of efficiency.

There is a real frustration at the root of these candidacies, and it would be a mistake to dismiss it. Colombia and Brazil are countries where insecurity is existential for millions of people, where inequality persists despite decades of formal progress, where institutional corruption has eroded confidence in the political class.

Even though De la Espriella and Flávio Bolsonaro are tapping into genuine concerns, the solutions they offer are not new responses to old problems. Economic shock therapy in largely unequal societies, militarized crackdowns in countries with a long history of institutional violence, and a lack of inherent agency in terms of foreign policy are just old responses to old problems. This time, retooled with new aesthetics and a new international support network.

Os autores não prestam consultoria, trabalham, possuem ações ou recebem financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que se beneficiaria deste artigo e não revelaram qualquer vínculo relevante além de seus cargos acadêmicos.