伊朗在霍尔木兹海峡拥有一个强大的新工具，可以在战争很久之后利用它。
Iran has a powerful new tool in the Strait of Hormuz th…
Iran’s leaders are demanding sovereignty over the strait for a reason: it protects them from future attacks and can be a very effective bargaining chip.
伊朗的领导人要求对该海峡拥有主权是有原因的：它能保护他们免受未来攻击，并且可以成为一个非常有效的筹码。
The Trump administration claims its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is working, with nine ships complying with orders to turn around.
特朗普政府声称，其对霍尔木兹海峡的封锁正在奏效，有九艘船服从了掉头指令。
One of those was a Chinese-owned tanker called the Rich Starry that turned around in the Gulf of Oman on Wednesday to head back through the strait.
其中一艘就是一艘名为“富星”（Rich Starry）的中国船籍油轮，它于周三在阿曼湾掉头，重新驶过海峡。
Iran, meanwhile, maintains it still has control over the strait and it will determine which ships transit through the crucial waterway. It also said if its ports are threatened, “no port in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman will remain safe”.
与此同时，伊朗坚持认为它仍然控制着该海峡，并将决定哪些船只可以经过这条关键水道。它还表示，如果其港口受到威胁，“波斯湾和阿曼海的任何港口都不会安全”。
No matter how the blockade plays out, Iran will be in a far better position in the long term when it comes to maintaining control over the strait – not the US.
无论封锁局势如何发展，从长远来看，维护对该海峡的控制权方面，伊朗会比美国处于更有利的地位。
Iran’s powerful new tool
伊朗的强大新工具
For decades, Iran had threatened to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage against its adversaries. It avoided doing so, however, until the current war against the United States and Israel, which it sees as existential.
数十年里，伊朗一直威胁要利用霍尔木兹海峡作为对抗敌人的筹码。然而，直到当前与美国和以色列的战争，伊朗认为这场战争关乎其生存，它才避免了这样做。
Ironically, while the US and Israel aimed to weaken Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities, the conflict has given Tehran a powerful new tool – control of the strait.
具有讽刺意味的是，当美国和以色列旨在削弱伊朗的核和导弹能力时，这场冲突反而给了德黑兰一个强大的新工具——对海峡的控制权。
Tehran is now likely to make this control a core part of its long-term strategic thinking. In fact, Iran’s negotiators in the recent peace talks with the US had added Iranian sovereignty over the strait to their list of demands.
德黑兰现在很可能会将其控制作为其长期战略思维的核心部分。事实上，伊朗最近与美国进行和平谈判的谈判代表团已将其对海峡的主权要求列入其诉求清单。
This leverage serves at least three key purposes.
这种筹码至少服务于三个关键目的。
First, it provides significant revenue potential from the tolls and transit fees it is already charging ships going through the strait.
第一，它提供了可观的收入潜力，源于它已经向通过海峡的船只收取的过路费和过境费。
By imposing minimal transit-related costs — estimated at around US$1 per barrel or up to US$2 million (A$2.8 million) per tanker — Iran could reportedly generate some US$600 million (A$836 million) per month from oil and another US$800 million (A$1.1 billion) per month from gas shipments.
通过征收最低的与过境相关的成本——估计每桶约1美元，或每艘油轮最高达200万美元（澳元280万）——据报道，伊朗每月可以从石油收入中获得约6亿美元（澳元8.36亿），并从天然气运输中获得另外8亿美元（澳元11亿）。
Economists say at least 80% of the tolls would be paid by the Persian Gulf states – or as much as US$14 billion (A$20 billion) a year on oil alone.
经济学家表示，至少80%的过路费将由波斯湾国家支付——仅石油部分每年就高达140亿美元（澳元200亿）。
Second, the strait functions as a security guarantee. By demonstrating its ability to disrupt a critical global energy artery, Iran has raised the cost of any future military action against it. This creates deterrence through economic risk rather than purely military means.
第二，该海峡充当了安全保障。通过展示其扰乱关键全球能源动脉的能力，伊朗提高了任何未来针对它的军事行动的成本。这通过经济风险而非纯粹的军事手段形成了威慑。
Third, it gives Iran geopolitical leverage, particularly with countries in the Global South. Control over the strait allows Iran to bargain with energy-dependent states, encouraging them to circumvent US sanctions on the regime and deepen economic engagement in exchange for concessions accessing the strait.
第三，它赋予了伊朗地缘政治筹码，尤其是在与全球南方国家打交道时。对海峡的控制使伊朗能够与能源依赖型国家进行谈判，鼓励它们为了获取海峡的便利，绕过美国对该政权的制裁并深化经济参与。
The US is now trying to neutralise Iran’s leverage over the strait. Yet, this “siege of a siege” faces clear structural limitations.
美国现在正试图消除伊朗对海峡的筹码。然而，这种“围困的围困”面临着明显的结构性限制。
For one, Iran’s control over the strait is much easier to maintain than a US blockade in international waters. Even with allied support (which has yet to materialise), the US would struggle to restrict access to the strait for an extended period. Such an effort would be highly costly for the US military and would have significant consequences for the global economy.
首先，伊朗对海峡的控制比美国在国际水域实施封锁更容易维持。即使有盟友支持（但尚未实现），美国也难以长时间限制进入海峡的通道。这种努力对美国军事力量来说成本极高，并将对全球经济产生重大影响。
In this sense, Hormuz risks becoming America’s Suez moment — a strategic chokepoint that reveals the limits of power rather than its reach.
从这个意义上说，霍尔木兹海峡有可能成为美国的“苏伊士时刻”——一个揭示权力局限而非其范围的战略瓶颈。
How will China react?
中国将如何反应？
But could China, which buys more than 80% of Iran’s oil, play a role in pressuring Iran to relax its control over the strait?
但中国购买了伊朗超过80%的石油，是否能发挥作用，向伊朗施压，要求其放松对海峡的控制？
It has not done yet, and is unlikely to do. So far, China is blaming the US and rejecting its blockade.
它尚未这样做，而且不太可能这样做。到目前为止，中国一直在指责美国，并拒绝其封锁。
In fact, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun used forceful language this week, calling the blockade “dangerous and irresponsible”.
事实上，中国外交部发言人郭建国本周使用了强硬措辞，称该封锁“危险且不负责任”。
Although one Chinese tanker has been turned around, others have transited through the new “tollbooth” system in recent days. This is an indication of China’s need and willingness to abide by Iran’s new rules – at least for the moment.
尽管一艘中国油轮被遣返，但其他油轮在最近几天通过了新的“收费站”系统。这表明中国有必要，并且愿意暂时遵守伊朗的新规定。
While China is exposed to the US blockade – about 40% of its oil imports come through the waterway – it has prepared for this moment.
尽管中国面临美国封锁——约40%的石油进口经由该水道——但它已经为这一时刻做好了准备。
It has diversified its oil imports to avoid being too reliant on any one supplier. And China is believed to have enough petroleum reserves to replace imports via the strait for up to seven months.
它已经使其石油进口来源多元化，以避免过度依赖任何单一供应商。据信，中国拥有足够的石油储备，可替代通过海峡的进口，长达七个月。
Still, it remains to be seen if China would support a toll system in the long term. Despite Beijing’s silence so far, some experts believe it would oppose this. China has repeatedly stressed the need to return to “normal passage” through the strait as soon as possible.
然而，中国长期是否支持收费系统仍有待观察。尽管北京迄今保持沉默，但一些专家认为它会反对这一点。中国一再强调，应尽快恢复通过海峡的“正常通行”。
China’s expanding role in the region
中国在该地区的日益增强的作用
China also stands to benefit from the political shifts that could come after the war.
中国也可能从战后出现的政治转变中受益。
The war has pushed the Gulf states toward a shared realisation that alignment with the US and partnership with Israel do not necessarily guarantee their security.
这场战争促使海湾国家认识到，与美国结盟和与以色列合作并不能必然保证其安全。
As a result, they may seek to diversify their relationships. This is reflected in the crown prince of Abu Dhabi’s visit to Beijing this week.
因此，它们可能会寻求实现关系多元化。这体现在阿布扎比亲王本周访问北京。
Trade between the Gulf states and China has grown significantly, with total exchanges reaching approximately US$257 billion (A$358 billion) in 2024, narrowly surpassing the Gulf’s combined trade with major Western economies.
海湾国家与中国之间的贸易显著增长，2024年总交易额达到约2570亿美元（澳元3580亿），略超过海湾国家与主要西方经济体的总贸易额。
China is also expanding its diplomatic footprint in the region, helping to mediate the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 to normalise relations and playing an indirect role in the recent Pakistan talks between Iran and the US to end the war. It clearly sees a bigger role in the region in the future.
中国也在扩大其在该地区的外交足迹，帮助调解了2023年沙特阿拉伯和伊朗恢复关系的协议，并在近期伊朗与美国结束战争的巴基斯坦会谈中发挥了间接作用。它显然看到了未来在该地区扮演更重要的角色。
Looking ahead, Iran may seek to leverage this moment to pursue a more regionally based security framework with the Gulf states, potentially with China acting as a guarantor or facilitator. Such a development would mark a significant departure from the longstanding US role as the primary security provider in the region.
展望未来，伊朗可能寻求利用这一时机，与海湾国家建立一个更具区域性的安全框架，中国可能充当担保方或促成方。此类发展将标志着美国长期以来作为该地区主要安全提供者的角色发生了重大转变。
Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Ali Mamouri不为任何受益于本文的公司或组织工作、提供咨询、拥有股份或接受资金，并且除了其学术任命外，未披露任何相关隶属关系。
