माली हमले: तुअरेग की शिकायतों का समाधान शांति की कुंजी है।

The precarious security situation in Mali took a turn for the worse in late April 2026. Well coordinated attacks targeted several cities and claimed the lives of the defence minister, Sadio Camara, and several Malian soldiers.

The events are a culmination of increased attacks over the past few years on the military and state institutions in Mali.

We have been researching insecurity and politics in west Africa and the Sahel for over a decade. We believe the recent attacks trace back to grievances expressed by Tuaregs that the current military regime has not addressed. The Tuaregs are nomadic Berber communities in northern Mali.

First is the inability or unwillingness to address Tuareg discontent. Their grievances centre on political autonomy, marginalisation, cultural recognition, resource control, security and perceived state neglect.

Second, the continuous use of force by the military against rebels in the northern regions without regard for the collateral damage. The Tuaregs have long contested the militarisation policies of successive Malian governments.

Third, the uneven distribution of resources, which keeps the northern region marginalised. These include northern Mali’s resources such as gold deposits, salt mines, grazing lands, and strategic trade corridors. Revenues from these sources remain controlled by the state’s centre based in the south.

Addressing resource marginalisation could have a number of benefits. It could temper Tuareg grievances, restore trust in the Malian state, and shift conflict incentives away from rebellion towards political inclusion, stability, and sustainable peace in northern Mali.

The breakdown

In April 2026 the jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) joined forces with ethnic Tuareg rebels from the northern Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) to attack several cities in the country recently.

This mirrors a similar attack in 2012 when the Tuareg and al-Qaeda-affiliated militants launched an offensive against the state. The Tuareg-dominated National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) attempted to secede and initiated a rebellion.

The MNLA is a Tuareg‑dominated separatist movement. Founded in 2011, it is mainly composed of ex-Libyan war returnees and northern Malian Tuaregs. The organisation had about 10,000 fighters at its peak in 2012.

Despite their numbers, they lacked the military power to hold the territory. As a result they aligned with Islamists Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) , and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) . Shortly after pushing back Malian forces in late 2012, the alliance disintegrated.

The Islamist groups were better armed and funded. They forced the secular separatists out of major towns like Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The intervention of French forces in 2013 helped the Malian government regain most of the lost territories.

AQIM and its allies then moved into the mountains and surrounding desert areas. They shifted to guerrilla tactics, including suicide bombings and landmines.

The withdrawal of French forces in 2022 seems to have emboldened the Islamist militants. It removed counter‑terrorism pressure, disrupted intelligence and logistics and created a security vacuum amid weak Malian state capacity. This allowed Islamist groups to expand operations, recruit locally and regain territorial influence.

Lessons unlearnt

The largely popular military regime of Assimi Goita has failed to address the demands of Tuareg separatists. The Tuaregs have historically complained about exclusion from power by the southern dominated Malian state. Since the country’s independence in 1960, Tuareg leaders have argued that the structure of the Malian state does not reflect their political identity, economic interests and governance traditions. The demand for self-rule or autonomy has been suppressed, often by force.

More recently, increased drought, desertification and climate variability has devastated Tuareg pastoral livelihoods. These grievances pre-date Islamic insurgency and are fundamental in understanding the approach of the group.

The second unaddressed issue is that counterterrorism operations use force which creates collateral damage. Recent analysis shows that counterterrorism operations in northern and central Mali have resulted in large scale civilian harm, displacement and collective punishments. These have included arbitrary arrests and mass killings.

These factors have created conditions which Islamist groups have exploited for recruitment, territorial control and legitimacy.

The blame for this has been put on successive Malian regimes and previous French operations. This has been a key reason for France’s interventions being labelled as failures.

The third major driver of violence in Mali relates to the uneven distribution of resources. Since independence, public investment, infrastructure, social services and political attention have been heavily concentrated in the southern parts of the country.

Previous peace agreements have promised decentralisation, funding and integration of northern elites and ex-combatants. But implementation have been slow or nonexistent.

Is there a way forward?

The Tuareg question must be answered to reduce the tension between the regions of the country. It can be argued that Tuareg actors have twice miscalculated by entering arrangements with jihadist groups. But this does not diminish the need to address the structural inequalities and long-standing grievances underpinning Tuareg demands.

To achieve this, the Malian regime can copy the blueprint of former president Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger. Prior to his presidency, the Nigerien Tuaregs were similarly aggrieved. When he became president in 2011, he:

integrated Tuareg elites and former rebels into state institutions

decentralised state authority by allowing administrative and budgetary control at the regional level

introduced disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Issoufou also invested in infrastructural development in the areas that directly affected the Tuaregs. This included pastoralism, education and livelihood support. Water access in arid pastoral areas was improved. And connectivity and road safety was expanded.

Addressing the Tuareg agitations would reduce tensions in Mali.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.