停火后，与伊朗谈判达成持久协议需要克服地区竞争和战略不一致性

President Donald Trump’s rapid and dramatic turn from threatening to kill “an entire civilization” in Iran on the morning of April 7, 2026, to announcing a two-week ceasefire later that day left many observers with a sense of whiplash.

While it is difficult to predict whether the ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran will hold or how events will unfold, the dynamics of the conflict so far reveal multiple vulnerabilities in the short term and numerous detrimental effects on the region in the medium to long term.

Already, the truce has shown signs of strain. Iran and the U.S. almost immediately offered dueling narratives about the agreement, including whether it would cover the war in Lebanon. Iran and Pakistan, the primary mediator, asserted that it would, while the U.S. and Israel, which pledged to honor the U.S. agreement, said it would not. Indeed, a day after the ceasefire came into force, Israel conducted some of its most intense bombing in Lebanon to date.

As an expert in Middle East politics, I believe that the involvement of so many governments and militant groups – in both the negotiation process and in terms of the regional effects of the conflict – make it more difficult to uphold a ceasefire.

Over the past decade, there has been a shift in regional alliances in the Middle East, leading to increasingly assertive foreign policies by many countries and a deepening rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The current war only fuels these dynamics, incentivizing competition and offering governments and militant groups new opportunities to exert leverage over opponents.

The current reality also underlines the idea that external intervention and privileging war over diplomacy has made conflict resolution ever more difficult in a region with a long history of imperial expansion, great power competition and bitter political divides.

Regional fault lines

One of the more remarkable aspects of the war in Iran that began on Feb. 28 was how quickly it escalated in terms of geographic scope and the actors pulled into it.

The three key countries involved – Israel, the U.S and Iran – are all facing internal political tensions, polarization and legitimacy crises.

Outside countries such as China, Russia and Pakistan have deployed their own strategic interests and diplomatic tools in the conflict in indirectly getting involved.

The conflict has also drawn in a variety of regional governments and other groups, from [Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states] to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.

All of that is bound to deepen the fault lines that make regional tensions and sectarian conflict more likely in the long run.

Meanwhile, public opinion in the Arab world shows profound damage to the United States’ reputation in the region and a loss of credibility in the international legal and humanitarian system.

I think these developments are also deeply troubling for the long term.

Events since the war began have been bad enough. The war has led to over 1,200 Iranian civilian deaths, over 3.2 million Iranians temporarily displaced and significant damage to Iranian infrastructure. Thirteen American soldiers have also died in the course of the conflict, as have more than two dozen in Israel and the Gulf states.

That’s to say nothing of the toll in Lebanon, where more than 1,500 people have died and more than 1 million displaced since the beginning of March.

The Houthis and the politics of regional instability

The Houthis in Yemen, one of the conflict participants that remained surprisingly silent at the outbreak of the war, are instructive for understanding the region’s complicated and fractured dynamics.

As a religious rebel movement that follows the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam, the Houthis, who took over Yemen’s capital in 2014, have been the target of sustained military operations by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since 2015. This has only pushed them closer to Tehran.

Avowed opponents of Israel, the Houthis declared war against the country following the Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza.

In 2024, the Houthis attacked maritime shipping in the Red Sea near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key maritime choke point. That prefigured, in a much smaller and less consequential way, Iran’s own actions in blocking the Strait of Hormuz during the current crisis.

That Houthi campaign to block maritime shipping resulted in a U.S.-led international coalition and significant military strikes against the insurgent group, their redesignation as a foreign terrorist organization, and ultimately a ceasefire deal between the U.S. and the Houthi movement in May 2025.

Yet the underlying regional disputes and domestic fractures that the Houthis were part of were never resolved.

Eventually, the Houthis reentered the fight against Israel amid the latest war in Iran, attacking Israel on March 28.

They refrained from attacks in the Red Sea and currently are observing the ceasefire. But entering the war enabled a weakened Houthi movement to signal resolve, military capacity and commitment to its alliance with Iran, just as Yemen continues to face an economic and severe humanitarian crisis. The Houthis now also have added leverage to play the role of spoiler amid ongoing diplomacy.

The costs of diplomacy avoidance

Of course, the Houthis are not the only movement that will perceive the war on Iran as an opportunity to exert regional influence.

Just as the Houthis and their enemies are using regional conflicts to boost their domestic legitimacy and strategic advantages, so too are the more salient participants − Iran, Israel and the U.S. − relitigating their own past conflicts on the battlefield.

Amid all of these current regional trends of crises and contestation, the United States’ own strategic goals have remained remarkably unclear. The Trump administration has vacillated from a focus on regime change to preventing Iran from developing nuclear capabilities.

So far, there are no indications that talks with Iran to extend the ceasefire into a full diplomatic agreement will successfully prevent Iran from pursuing uranium enrichment. Indeed, one of the contested points of the framework for talks with Iran is the apparent acceptance of Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment.

In 2018, Trump abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or so-called Iran deal. In it, Iran agreed to terms, including limiting uranium enrichment, that would block its path to a nuclear weapon, should it have desired one.

Under the Iran deal, Tehran had also complied with inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It was not until much after American withdrawal from the agreement that Iran once again started stockpiling uranium and pursuing enrichment.

In her 2020 book on the tenuous 22-month diplomatic process leading to the Iran deal, aptly titled “Not for the Faint of Heart,” Ambassador Wendy Sherman wrote how complex, challenging and delicate such multiparty negotiations can be.

But the recent war on Iran suggests that the current machine-gun politics approach toward Tehran and the Middle East favored by the U.S. and Israel comes with serious costs and risks.

In the course of a war with unclear targets, vague strategic objectives and high human costs, the region is far less stable than it was when the conflict began. That has made the path to long-term durable peace all the more difficult now that diplomacy is back on the table.

Ioana Emy Matesan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.