Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia emerge as a new regional power bloc amid Iran war

巴基斯坦、土耳其、埃及和沙特阿拉伯在伊朗战争背景下成为新的区域强国集团

Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia emerge as a ne…

Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

Pakistan played a leading role in negotiating the ceasefire in Iran.

巴基斯坦在谈判伊朗停火协议中发挥了主导作用。

Pakistan’s prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif, announced that a two-week ceasefire had been agreed between the US and Iran in the early hours of April 8. Delegates from both sides are expected to attend further talks in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad on Friday.

巴基斯坦总理谢赫巴兹·谢里夫宣布,美国和伊朗于当地时间4月8日凌晨同意进行为期两周的停火。预计双方代表将于周五在巴基斯坦首都伊斯兰堡参加进一步的会谈。

This comes less than two weeks after Pakistan hosted talks with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey in which the four countries called for an end to hostilities in the Gulf. The meeting established the quartet as the primary negotiating channel between Tehran and Washington, and may signal the beginning of a new regional order designed to curb Israeli and Iranian dominance after the war.

此前不到两周,巴基斯坦曾与沙特阿拉伯、埃及和土耳其举行了会谈,这四个国家呼吁结束海湾地区的敌对行动。此次会议将这四国确立为德黑兰和华盛顿之间的主要谈判渠道,并可能预示着一场旨在遏制以色列和伊朗主导地位的新区域秩序的开始。

Even before the war began in late February, Israel and Iran were both isolated in the region. There is no chance of any rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which was the original goal of the 2020 Abraham accords. These accords sought to normalise relations between Israel and other countries in the Middle East.

即使在二月下旬战争爆发之前,以色列和伊朗在该地区也一直处于孤立状态。以色列和沙特阿拉伯之间没有任何和解的可能,而这曾是2020年《亚伯拉罕协议》的最初目标。这些协议旨在促进以色列与其他中东国家的正常化关系。

The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed agreements with Israel as part of the accords. But the Saudis have long said they will not normalise ties with Israel before the establishment of a Palestinian state, which was ruled out by the Israeli parliament in a 2024 vote. Reports suggest that Saudi Arabia now wants to replace Israel with Syria as the transit country for a fiber-optic cable connecting the kingdom to Greece.

阿拉伯联合酋长国和巴林作为协议的一部分与以色列签署了协议。但沙特阿拉伯一直表示,在建立巴勒斯坦国之前,它们不会与以色列正常化关系,而以色列议会已在2024年投票否决了这一设想。有报道称,沙特阿拉伯现在希望用叙利亚取代以色列,作为连接该国和希腊的光纤电缆的过境国。

Turkey also halted its relationship with Israel in 2024 over the conflict in Gaza. And relations between Israel and Qatar soured in September 2025 after an Israeli strike on Hamas leaders in Doha, which drew unanimous condemnation from the UN security council.

土耳其也因加沙冲突于2024年暂停了与以色列的关系。而以色列和卡塔尔的关系则在2025年9月恶化,此前以色列对多哈的哈马斯领导人发动了袭击,该事件招致了联合国安理会的普遍谴责。

Iran’s only main allies are Russia and, to a much lesser extent, China and the Houthi rebel group in Yemen. Since the conflict with the US and Israel began, China has distanced itself from Iran. The Houthis recently became involved in the war in support of Iran, but they have been weakened by Israeli attacks in recent years.

伊朗唯一的主要盟友是俄罗斯,其次是中国和也门的胡塞叛军。自与美国和以色列的冲突开始以来,中国一直与伊朗保持距离。胡塞叛军最近参与了支持伊朗的战争,但近年来也一直受到以色列的攻击削弱。

The solid relationship between Qatar and Iran has been severed after Iranian missiles struck the country’s main gas facility, Ras Laffan, on March 18. And Iran’s partial detente with Saudi Arabia, which was brokered by China in 2023 after years of hostility, has now been destroyed following Iranian attacks on Saudi energy facilities.

在伊朗导弹于3月18日袭击了该国主要的天然气设施拉斯拉凡后,卡塔尔和伊朗之间稳固的关系被切断。此外,伊朗与沙特阿拉伯之间部分缓和的关系,此前由中国在2023年促成,结束了多年的敌对状态,现已因伊朗对沙特能源设施的袭击而破裂。

It is against this backdrop, in which both Iran and Israel are considered regional pariahs, that Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt have ramped up their efforts to secure stability in the Middle East.

正是在这样的背景下,伊朗和以色列都被视为区域上的弃儿,巴基斯坦、沙特阿拉伯、土耳其和埃及加大了努力,以确保中东地区的稳定。

A new order?

新秩序?

These four countries share some common areas of interest that help explain their desire to reshape the region. They all have political and economic ties with the US and are members of Donald Trump’s Board of Peace. Established in 2026, the board aims to tackle global conflicts and achieve lasting peace and reconstruction in Gaza.

这四个国家拥有一些共同的兴趣领域,有助于解释他们重塑该地区的心态。它们都与美国有政治和经济联系,并且是唐纳德·特朗普和平委员会的成员。该委员会成立于2026年,旨在解决全球冲突,并在加沙实现持久和平与重建。

Each country also brings important contributions to their burgeoning alliance. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia has the world’s second-largest oil reserves, Egypt controls access to the vital Suez canal waterway and Turkey is a member of the Nato alliance. All have fairly advanced defence industries and a combined population of 500 million people. Taken together, they represent the most politically and militarily influential Muslim-majority countries in the world.

每个国家也为他们蓬勃发展的联盟带来了重要的贡献。巴基斯坦拥有核武器,沙特阿拉伯拥有世界第二大石油储备,埃及控制着重要的苏伊士运河水道,土耳其是北约联盟的成员。它们都拥有相当先进的国防工业,总人口达5亿。总而言之,它们代表了世界上最具政治和军事影响力的穆斯林占多数国家。

But these four nations are not necessarily natural allies, and their relationships have experienced turbulence over the years. Egypt’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, for example, has often been described as a “difficult marriage”. Egypt was once the driver of pan-Arab nationalism, a movement that promotes a secular and unified Arab political identity.

但这四个国家并非必然是天生的盟友,它们的关系多年来经历过动荡。例如,埃及与沙特阿拉伯的关系经常被描述为“一段艰难的婚姻”。埃及曾是泛阿拉伯民族主义的推动者,该运动提倡一种世俗化和统一的阿拉伯政治身份。

The Saudi kingdom has historically viewed this movement as a threat. But since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power as Egypt’s president in 2014, their differences have been overcome. Sisi offered political and military support to the Saudi operation against the Houthis in 2015, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia subsequently deepening their defence ties.

沙特王国历史上一直视该运动为威胁。但自2014年阿卜杜勒法塔赫·塞西担任埃及总统以来,两国的分歧已经得以克服。2015年,塞西向沙特阿拉伯支持了其针对胡塞武装的行动,随后埃及和沙特阿拉伯深化了国防联系。

Particularly under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey has positioned itself as a regional leader and problem solver. But Turkey, too, has endured periods of frosty relations with other regional powers. Ankara’s relations with Cairo deteriorated sharply after the Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi, a close ally of Turkey, was ousted in a 2013 coup.

特别是在雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安的领导下,土耳其将自己定位为区域领导者和问题解决者。但土耳其也经历过与其他区域大国关系冰点时期。在埃及总统穆罕默德·默西(一位与土耳其关系密切的盟友)于2013年政变中被推翻后,安卡拉与开罗的关系急剧恶化。

Similarly, tensions between Turkey and Saudi Arabia became particularly acute following the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. A 2021 US intelligence report found that Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman approved the murder, though he denies this allegation.

同样,土耳其和沙特阿拉伯之间的紧张局势,在2018年记者贾马尔·哈沙米在伊斯坦布尔沙特领事馆被谋杀后变得尤为尖锐。一份2021年美国情报报告发现,沙特亲王穆罕默德·本·萨尔曼批准了这起谋杀案,尽管他否认了这一指控。

A process of rapprochement took place between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in 2022, and then between Turkey and Egypt in 2025. Erdoğan visited Cairo and Riyadh in February 2026 and has proposed several different geoeconomic frameworks to connect Asia with Europe. These include the so-called Middle East Corridor, a planned economic corridor aimed at fostering economic integration between Asia, the Persian Gulf and Europe.

土耳其和沙特阿拉伯在2022年之间,随后土耳其和埃及在2025年之间,经历了一次和解过程。埃尔多安于2026年2月访问了开罗和利雅得,并提出了几种不同的地缘经济框架,旨在连接亚洲和欧洲。其中包括所谓的“中东走廊”,这是一个旨在促进亚洲、波斯湾和欧洲之间经济一体化的计划经济走廊。

Pakistan, meanwhile, has so far not come to Saudi Arabia’s aid when it has come under attack from Iran in the current conflict. This is despite the signing of a strategic mutual defence agreement between the two countries in 2025.

与此同时,在当前冲突中,当沙特阿拉伯受到伊朗攻击时,巴基斯坦迄今尚未提供援助。尽管两国于2025年签署了战略互防协议。

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey have not always seen eye to eye. But their relationships of convenience are now becoming increasingly significant as Israel and Iran’s regional isolation grows.

沙特阿拉伯、埃及、巴基斯坦和土耳其并非总是意见一致。但随着以色列和伊朗的区域孤立日益加剧,它们之间出于便利的合作关系正变得越来越重要。

Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

娜塔莎·林德斯泰特(Natasha Lindstaedt)不为任何受益于本文的公司或组织工作、咨询、持有股份或接受资金,并且除了其学术任命外,未披露任何相关隶属关系。