Why Nairobi Africa-France summit bears the hallmarks of Macron and Ruto priorities
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内罗毕非洲-法国峰会为何体现了马克龙和鲁托的优先事项

Why Nairobi Africa-France summit bears the hallmarks of…

Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht University

The business start-up vibe of the Nairobi summit is no coincidence.

内罗毕峰会那种商业初创企业的氛围并非巧合。

The 2026 Africa-France summit in Nairobi on May 11-12 is the first to be held in an African country that is not a former French colony. It is also the first to be held since the dramatic collapse of relations between France and a number of west African countries – notably Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

2026年5月11日至12日在内罗毕举行的非洲-法国峰会是首次在非洲一个非前法殖民地国家举行。这也是自法国与若干西非国家——特别是马里、布基纳法索和尼日尔——关系发生剧烈变化以来首次举行。

The 2026 summit can be understood as the latest example of President Emmanuel Macron’s new Africa doctrine, which he laid out in Burkina Faso in 2017. The doctrine’s three notable messages were:

2026年的峰会可以被理解为埃马纽埃尔·马克龙总统新的非洲方针的最新例证,该方针于2017年在布基纳法索阐述。该方针的三个显著信息是:

an apology for colonial wrongs

对殖民错误的道歉

a neoliberal small-business approach to assistance programmes

一种新自由主义的小企业援助计划方法

the French resolve to develop new alliances outside French Africa.

法国致力于在法国非洲以外发展新联盟。

In keeping with the new doctrine, the French president hesitantly apologised in 2021 for some aspects of French colonial policy in Algeria. These include the torture and assassination of the Algerian nationalist hero Ali Boumendjel.

为了遵循这一新方针,法国总统在2021年对阿尔及利亚的某些殖民政策方面犹豫地道歉。这包括对阿尔及利亚民族英雄阿里·布门杰尔的酷刑和暗杀。

But mostly, Macron has looked to strengthen the position of Paris as old alliances were becoming weaker.

但主要的是,马克龙希望加强巴黎的地位,因为旧的联盟正在变得更弱。

He has consciously invested time and effort beyond French west Africa. The official visit to Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony, is a case in point.

他有意识地将时间和精力投入到法国西非以外的地区。对前葡萄牙殖民地吉布萨的官方访问就是一个例证。

Right after his election in 2017, France’s development aid agency (AFD) and the Tony Elumelu Foundation signed an agreement in Nigeria to empower a new generation of business leaders. Tony Elumelu Foundation is a Lagos-based non-profit that promotes youth entrepreneurship across Africa.

在2017年当选之后,法国的发展援助机构(AFD)和托尼·埃卢梅卢基金会(Tony Elumelu Foundation)在尼日利亚签署了一项协议,旨在赋权新一代商界领袖。托尼·埃卢梅卢基金会是一家总部位于拉各斯的非营利组织,致力于促进非洲的青年创业。

Macron then promoted entrepreneurship during the New France-Africa Summit in 2021. He sought to inspire the youth of Africa to innovate and set up businesses.

马克龙在2021年的新法-非洲峰会期间推广了创业精神。他试图激励非洲的青年创新并建立企业。

This year’s conference is held under the banner: “Africa Forward: Partnerships between Africa and France for innovation and growth”. The business start-up vibe is no coincidence.

今年的会议以“非洲前行:非洲与法国在创新和增长方面的伙伴关系”为主题。这种商业初创企业的氛围并非巧合。

Kenya has also stressed the groundbreaking nature of the meeting for its focus on Africa as a major partner for Europe. Europe is looking for new allies in the midst of a war in Ukraine; and the US is unreliable, with Donald Trump imposing tariffs and questioning the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

肯尼亚也强调了这次会议的开创性,因为它关注非洲作为欧洲的主要伙伴。欧洲在乌克兰战争中寻求新的盟友;而美国不可靠,唐纳德·特朗普实施关税并质疑北大西洋公约组织。

As a historian of global north-global south relations, I see the meeting less as groundbreaking, and more as a continuation of an older, mutually beneficial relationship between Kenya and France.

作为一个全球北方-全球南方关系的历史学家,我将这次会议视为肯尼亚和法国之间更古老、互利的关系的延续,而不仅仅是开创性的。

Kenya hopes its relationship with France will elevate its influence across Africa, allowing it to rival the diplomatic weight of South Africa, which hosted the G20 summit in November 2025.

肯尼亚希望与法国的关系将提升其在非洲的影响力,使其能够与南非的外交分量相媲美,南非于2025年11月主办了G20峰会。

By transcending the classic divide between French and British Africa, Nairobi can present itself as a continental leader and as a diplomacy city.

通过超越法国和英国非洲之间的经典分歧,内罗毕可以将其自身定位为大陆领导者和外交之城。

History of the relationship between France and Kenya

法国与肯尼亚的关系史

The economic and diplomatic relationship goes back to the 1960s and 1970s. Back in September 1970 France sent a little-known legal expert called Jaques Mollet to advise the Kenyan Ministry of Industry and Commerce on the newly-formed East African Community.

经济和外交关系可以追溯到20世纪60年代和70年代。1970年9月,法国派了一位鲜为人知的法律专家雅克·莫莱(Jaques Mollet)前往肯尼亚,就新成立的东非共同体向肯尼亚工业和商业部提供咨询。

France also sought cooperation with institutions of the East African Community such as the East African Development Bank. By becoming a close partner of a newly established regional economic bloc in Africa, in which Nairobi played a pivotal role, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to weaken the British influence of Africa while strengthening its own position within the European Economic Community, now the EU.

法国还寻求与东非共同体等机构合作,例如东非开发银行。通过成为非洲一个新成立的区域经济集团的紧密伙伴,内罗毕在该集团中扮演了关键角色,法国外交部试图削弱英国在非洲的影响力,同时加强其在欧洲经济共同体(现为欧盟)的地位。

Paris somewhat cynically justified its meddling as a way to strengthen continental unity since a French and a British sphere of influence in Africa would lead to unnecessary internal competition between the Commonwealth countries in Africa and Françafrique.

巴黎有些愤世嫉俗地为自己的干预辩护,认为这是加强大陆统一的一种方式,因为法国和英国在非洲的影响力将导致英联邦国家以及法兰西特区(Françafrique)之间不必要的内部竞争。

Kenya sought to strengthen its trade relations with France and the EEC in the 1960s. This was partly an attempt to become more independent of the Commonwealth. When negotiating with the EEC in 1963, an east African delegation that included Kenya’s Minister of Labour Tom Mboya stressed that maintaining the East African Common Market was key – not the Commonwealth.

肯尼亚在20世纪60年代寻求加强与法国和欧洲经济共同体(EEC)的贸易关系。这部分是为了脱离英联邦而寻求更多独立。在1963年与欧洲经济共同体谈判时,一个包括肯尼亚劳工部长汤姆·姆博亚(Tom Mboya)在内的东非代表团强调,维持东非共同市场是关键,而不是英联邦。

Ruto and Macron’s shared understanding

Ruto 和马克龙的共同理解

The similarities between Kenya’s President William Ruto and Macron further strengthen this historical bond between Kenya and France. They share the same diplomatic goals. They are both focusing on climate change funding and security, and they share a preference for neoliberal privatisation as a mode for governance at home and abroad.

肯尼亚总统威廉·鲁托和马克龙之间的相似之处进一步加强了肯尼亚与法国之间的历史纽带。他们拥有相同的外交目标。他们都专注于气候变化资金和安全问题,并且都倾向于将新自由主义私有化作为国内和国际治理的模式。

Ruto’s election campaign in 2022 touted the “hustler nation” – a focus on enabling small businesses. Macron has acted as a businessman-diplomat abroad, pushing small businesses as a solution for underdevelopment.

鲁托在2022年的选举活动宣传了“奋斗者国家”——专注于促进小企业的发展。马克龙在国外扮演了商人-外交家的角色,将小企业作为发展中国家的解决方案。

It’s no accident therefore that the 2026 summit will host a business forum and talks will focus on the potential benefits of artificial intelligence. AI, climate initiatives and weapons manufacturing, as well as the small-business ventures that have emerged through these priorities, are areas of cooperation and investment between African countries and the former colonial powers. Politicians like to flaunt this.

因此,2026年的峰会举办商业论坛,讨论将集中于人工智能的潜在益处,这并非偶然。人工智能、气候倡议和武器制造,以及通过这些优先事项出现的那些小企业,是非洲国家与前殖民强国之间合作和投资的领域。政客们喜欢炫耀这一点。

Part of the reason is that these are yet unproven ventures with no long history of unequal exchange between the two sides. They are natural common ground for two sides seeking a renewed relationship that is less burdened by the dark history of colonial oppression.

部分原因在于这些仍然是未经证实的冒险,双方之间没有不平等的交换历史。它们是双方寻求一种不再被殖民压迫的黑暗历史所束缚的关系的自然共同基础。

Yet France and Kenya’s agreement about the need to address security, climate change and artificial intelligence obscures the fact that both countries often find themselves on opposing sides of these issues.

然而,法国和肯尼亚就应对安全、气候变化和人工智能的需要达成的协议,掩盖了这两个国家往往在这些问题上处于对立一方的事实。

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has shown, African and European leaders do not necessarily share the same analysis of the global security situation. European countries assumed they would get complete support from African countries but only 28 out of 54 African countries voted in favour of a United Nations resolution that condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Kenya abstained.

正如2022年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰所显示的那样,非洲和欧洲的领导人并不一定对全球安全局势有相同的分析。欧洲国家认为他们将从非洲国家获得完全的支持,但只有54个非洲国家中的28个投票支持了谴责俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的联合国决议。肯尼亚弃权了。

On issues like climate change and artificial intelligence, France and Kenya again agree on the broad principle that these issues require urgent action, but disagree on the form the action should take.

在气候变化和人工智能等问题上,法国和肯尼亚再次就这些问题需要紧急行动的广泛原则达成一致,但在行动的形式上却存在分歧。

For instance, climate change has hit Kenya hard. Extended droughts require genuine climate action. At the same time, France and the EU have been talking about loosening climate regulations to address the energy crisis caused by the US war on Iran. This includes easing emission regulations for cars.

例如,气候变化对肯尼亚造成了沉重打击。持续的干旱需要真正的气候行动。同时,法国和欧盟一直在讨论放宽气候法规,以应对美国对伊朗的战争造成的能源危机。这包括放宽汽车的排放法规。

The same problem presents itself in relation to the AI economy, which is being championed by France. It is cheap labourers in Kenya that have been doing much of the legwork to keep AI applications going. Large language models and other applications need to be trained and monitored by humans and they are often trained in Kenya’s so-called “AI sweat shops”. Kenyans are doing much of the data labelling and content moderation AI work.

同样的问题也体现在人工智能经济方面,这是法国所倡导的。是肯尼亚的廉价劳工在维持人工智能应用方面做了大部分的后勤工作。大型语言模型和其他应用需要被人类训练和监控,它们通常在肯尼亚所谓的“人工智能汗水坊”中进行训练。肯尼亚人正在做大量的AI数据标注和内容审核工作。

Long term relationship?

长期关系?

In essence, the summit illustrates how climate finance, security and AI are being used to bolster commercial interests in both Africa and France, a strategic attempt to redefine a relationship long shadowed by colonialism.

本质上,这次峰会说明了气候融资、安全和人工智能是如何被用来加强非洲和法国双方的商业利益的,这是对长期被殖民主义阴影笼罩的关系进行重新定义的战略尝试。

However, the future of this entrepreneur-led approach remains uncertain. Its success hinges on whether France and Kenya can ensure that the wealth generated by these emerging sectors is distributed broadly, or if it will merely enrich a small circle of tech elites.

然而,这种由企业家主导的方法的未来仍然不确定。它的成功取决于法国和肯尼亚是否能够确保这些新兴部门产生的财富得到广泛分配,还是仅仅使一小撮科技精英受益。

Frank Gerits does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

弗兰克·格里茨不为、不咨询、不拥有任何可能从本文中受益的公司或组织,并且除了他们的学术职位之外,未披露任何相关隶属关系。