俄罗斯缩减的胜利日阅兵讲述了一个故事：抛开盛大场面，乌克兰战争不会按照普京的计划进行。

Victory Day in Russia, which marks the surrender of Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union, has long held particular importance in Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

Yet this year the May 9 celebration – usually replete with extensive parades across the country and a demonstration of military hardware in Moscow – is expected to be significantly pared down. That’s due to Kyiv’s ongoing long-range military capabilities. For the first time in two decades, Russian officials have said, there will be no lavish display of tanks and missiles.

The reality for Putin is that the war in Ukraine, now in its fifth year, continues to be a grueling drain on Russian men, its economy and resources – and may continue to be for some time.

That was underscored by the European Union’s April 23 approval of a US$106 billion loan package to Ukraine. The aid, which will be a boon to Ukraine’s war-torn economy, had been stymied by EU-member Hungary under its former president, Viktor Orban, who was ousted in April 12 elections.

The resumption of EU aid and the removal of a pro-Moscow European voice at the EU represent major blows to Russia’s regional strategy. Perhaps trying to reset the narrative, Russia declared it would mark this Victory Day with a two-day ceasefire with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded by saying his country would also observe a ceasefire, starting two days earlier on May 6.

But there remain few immediate signs of a breakthrough in the conflict – and Russia appears chiefly interested in negotiating Ukraine’s future not with Kyiv but with U.S. President Donald Trump, who has been sympathetic to Russian interests.

As a scholar of contemporary politics in Eastern Europe, I see that as part of a pattern of Russian miscalculations and consistent denial of the will of citizens in democratic societies in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it reflects a dominant imperial mindset among Russia’s political elites, which the Kremlin has not altered since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Losing hold of the old Soviet bloc?

While formally recognizing the independence of former Soviet republics in 1991, Moscow has continued to treat those countries as part of its sphere of influence.

For more than 25 years, Russia has pursued a hybrid approach of influencing former Soviet countries, along with others in Eastern Europe. That has included supporting electoral fraud, economic machination, media manipulation and use of force and violence.

Indeed, suspected Russian interference in politics and elections has been a frequent occurrence in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and most recently Hungary.

But Hungary and Armenia are recent and powerful examples that show the limits of Russian operations. Orban’s loss in Hungary immediately dislodged Russia’s most powerful point of leverage in European politics.

Meanwhile, in Yerevan on May 5, Armenia hosted a bilateral summit with the EU where the country established stronger economic and defense ties to the bloc. It was a stark diplomatic event for the country that has long been a junior ally of Russia’s but which has increasingly moved away from Moscow.

Ukraine: A test of Russian policy

Yet Ukraine remains the focal point of both the extent and limits of Russian external interference.

Putin has been attempting to have a loyal proxy government in the country ever since being spurned by Leonid Kuchma – the second president of Ukraine, who was in office until 2005 – who proclaimed that “Ukraine is not Russia.”

In Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections, Putin’s Kremlin threw its substantial resources behind Kuchma’s prime minister, Viktor Yanukovich, who was seen as more friendly to Russian interests.

Since then, its relationship with the country has been one of external interference. Putin’s message throughout has been clear: The West, in its fights against Russia, has sought to colonize and destroy Ukraine by supporting nationalist forces against Moscow’s interests.

Facing consistently strong Ukrainian civil society and sovereignty movements, Russia found it difficult to fully implement its goals through political subversion or influence. So Moscow increasingly turned to military options.

In March 2014, Russia moved to annex Crimea and began a war in Ukraine’s eastern border regions of Luhansk and Donetsk.

That war in the east ground on for years, until in 2022 Putin made the decision to double down yet again, this time opting for a full invasion. The goal of the war was in Putin’s own words to “de-militarize” and “de-nazify” Ukraine. Yet, four years later, Putin’s desire for regime change has not yielded the desired results.

The human cost of Russian pursuits

Over the past year, Trump’s commitment to a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia, without first establishing a durable ceasefire, has moved the U.S. position toward Putin’s. That has included Trump’s support for Ukraine territorial concession as the grinding war continues.

Without significant territorial gains, Russia has continued and intensified its campaign of mass airstrikes and drone attacks on Ukrainian population centers. Indeed, 2025 was the deadliest year since the start of the full-scale invasion; civilian deaths were up 26% in 2025 over the previous year.

In the especially cold winter of 2025-26, Russia consistently targeted the energy grids vital to the millions of Ukrainians. Across Ukraine, at the record-low freezing temperatures, people endured daily attacks by drones and artillery, while trying to survive without electricity, heat and running water.

The Kremlin’s plan to put maximum pressure on Ukrainian civilians in the hope that Ukrainians would start blaming their leadership for refusing peace on Putin’s terms has not worked. For its part, the Ukrainian leadership has refused Russia’s maximalist war aims while cautiously continuing a commitment to the U.S.-mediated peace process.

Zelenskyy’s approval ratings remain steady at around 60%. The public opposition to Moscow’s demands on territorial concessions have not budged either, with a majority of Ukrainians continuing to categorically reject territorial concessions. Those numbers have not changed significantly since 2024.

Yet, war and surviving it takes a toll. And the experience of the year of negotiations has left many disillusioned, with some 70% doubting that peace talks will lead to a lasting solution.

A murky future

The last rounds of U.S.-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine took place Feb. 16, 2026.

While Zelenskyy insists that the talks are not stalled, Russian’s top diplomat, Sergey Lavrov, has said the negotiations are not Russia’s top priority.

Buoyed by high oil prices as a result of the U.S. war in Iran, Russia has pursued a spring offensive and not relinquished its demands on Ukraine’s territories.

Yet this demand remains a nonstarter for Ukraine and Zelenskyy. As the Trump administration embraces the Russian “land for security” plan, Russia and its allies are likely to continue to put pressure on Zelenskyy, portraying him as an obstacle to peace talks.

But especially given Moscow’s recent woes, from losing a reliable ally in Hungary to the related EU loan guarantee, it’s unlikely that a continued grinding war will convince Ukrainians to abandon their sovereignty – or serve Russia’s own security.

Lena Surzhko Harned does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.