الحب، والسعي، والمغامرة: السرد القصصي وراء خطابات شي جين بينغ والاستراتيجية الكبرى للصين

For many in the West, China still feels hard to fully understand. Public debate and media coverage too often focus on the “China threat”. Critics highlight the flaws of China’s political system and limits on freedom, yet China has still managed to rise as a major power that can now compete with the United States.

One reason for this gap in understanding is that the media often interprets China through a Western-centric perspective.

US President Donald Trump’s summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping this week, for instance, will be analysed in the West very differently from the way it will be seen in China. Xi’s language will be parsed and scrutinised for couched messages, veiled threats and hidden meanings.

But analysts may be missing some of the tools China uses to explain and justify its actions.

My co-authored new research offers a new way to look at China’s grand strategy: by analysing the way the government uses storytelling. My research partners and I are part of a growing group of scholars looking at how geopolitics is becoming a contest of narratives – how states tell stories about themselves and each other.

To do this, we studied four major speeches by Xi from 2021–23. We read them as stories and dissected the narratives – as well as the characters and language – to better understand the meaning behind the words.

Why narrative in politics matters

The use of political narratives by leaders is not new.

In ancient Athens and Rome, politicians relied on strong public rhetoric to persuade people. Aristotle described three key elements of persuasion in rhetoric: logic (logos) , emotional appeal (pathos) , and the speaker’s credibility (ethos) .

Modern theorists like Kenneth Burke argue rhetoric creates a sense of shared purpose between leaders and the public, but it can also create division between groups.

And communications scholar Michael Kent identifies 20 master “plots” that have been used by storytellers for thousands of years to craft effective narratives. These include: quest, adventure, pursuit, transformation, revenge, sacrifice, discovery and of course love.

My research partners and I used these plot devices to analyse Xi’s speeches to see how he communicates – and tells stories – about China’s strategies.

The plot devices in Xi’s speeches

We found several master plots that consistently shape China’s official stories:

Adventure

In the Chinese Communist Party’s 100th anniversary speech in 2021, Xi said:

To save the nation from peril, the Chinese people put up a courageous fight. As noble-minded patriots sought to pull the nation together.

This storyline frames China as a nation on a long journey towards strength and prosperity, marked by setbacks and breakthroughs. This is seen as a type of political adventure. This narrative also appeals to shared memories in China of hardship and endurance.

Quest

Xi’s speeches also described a quest – the nation’s striving towards a difficult goal, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) .

In Xi’s 20th Party Congress report in 2022, he said:

There has never been an instruction manual or ready-made solution for the Chinese people and the Chinese nation to turn to […] as they moved on toward the bright future of rejuvenation.

The message is intended to inspire unity, patriotism and pride among Chinese listeners.

Transformation

In his 14th National People’s Congress speech in 2023, Xi said:

The Chinese nation has achieved the great transformation from standing up and growing prosperous to becoming strong, and China’s national rejuvenation has become a historical inevitability.

Transformation stories describe not just change, but growth and renewal. This narrative presents China’s rise as a natural evolution built on decades of reform and sacrifice.

Rivalry

Rivalry stories tend to feature internal and external threats.

In two of the speeches we studied, Xi refers to efforts by foreign powers to “blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China,” and recalls a past when foreign bullying caused “great suffering”.

In the CCP’s 100th anniversary speech, Xi also said:

Anyone who would attempt to do so will find themselves on a collision course with a great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people.

These storylines reinforce the idea that China must remain vigilant and united against outside pressure.

Love

Xi doesn’t refer to a romantic-type of love story in his speeches; rather, he speaks of the dedication and loyalty of the Communist Party’s supporters.

In the 100th anniversary speech, for instance, Xi said:

And I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to people and friends from around the world who have shown friendship to the Chinese people and understanding and support for China’s endeavours in revolution, development and reform.

How audiences see these messages

The impact of this messaging is strong at home. It’s often reinforced through state media, cultural products and patriotic education to reach as wide an audience as possible.

The frequent contrast between past suffering and present strength encourages the public to see China as a peaceful but firm global actor.

For a foreign audience, this storytelling can help other countries interpret China’s actions and anticipate its responses.

For example, China’s narratives about past humiliation and the need to defend its sovereignty help explain its strong stance on Taiwan – and the Communist Party’s legitimacy on this issue in the eyes of the people.

But this does not mean a military conflict is inevitable. Any future military action over Taiwan would depend on a multitude of factors, including careful calculations of risk, China’s economic interdependence with the world, and the potentially catastrophic consequences for the region and its people.

This cannot be easily conveyed in storytelling, which is why we can’t rely on this device alone to explain China’s actions. But it does give us a window into leadership’s thinking – and in a political system like China’s, this is vital.

The author would like to acknowledge her co-researchers on the project: Mitchell Hobbs of the University of Sydney (project lead) , and Zhao Alexandre Huang and Lucile Desmoulins of Gustave Eiffel University, France.

This piece is based on the author’s contribution to a research project funded by the Australia-France Social Science Collaborative Research Program from the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia.