This conflict is fast becoming a catestrophic US failure which could define Trump’s second presidency.
这场冲突正迅速演变成美国灾难性的失败，并可能决定特朗普的第二个任期。
Two months into the war in Iran, the reasons the US gave for launching this conflict – and Washington’s minimum criteria for claiming success – now appear unintelligible. So much so that US officials are now arguing the war had actually ended in America’s favour almost a month ago, when the ceasefire came into effect.
进入伊朗战争的两个月，美国提出的发动这场冲突的理由——以及华盛顿声称取得成功的最低标准——现在显得令人费解。甚至到了让美国官员们争辩说，在停火生效前大约一个月，战争实际上已经对美国有利。
It is hard to think of a more damning indictment of Donald Trump’s catastrophic war in Iran than the spectacle of his secretary of state, Marco Rubio, telling reporters on May 5 that the main goal now was to get the Strait of Hormuz “back to the way it was: anyone can use it, no mines in the water, nobody paying tolls”.
比对唐纳德·特朗普在伊朗的灾难性战争提出更具指控性的证据，莫过其国务卿马可·卢比奥在5月5日告诉记者，目前的主要目标是让霍尔木兹海峡“恢复到原来的状态：任何人都可以使用，水里没有水雷，没有人收过路费”。
This, he argued, was an entirely separate defensive and humanitarian operation and would only become a war if US ships came under fire – which they in fact did that same day. Rubio ignored the obvious contradiction that the humanitarian operation had been necessitated by the very war he was simultaneously presenting as already won.
他辩称，这是一项完全独立的防御和人道主义行动，只有当美国船只遭到攻击时才会演变成战争——而事实上，就在同一天，美国船只确实遭到了攻击。卢比奥忽略了这样一个明显的矛盾：这项人道主义行动，恰恰是由于他同时宣称已经胜利的这场战争所导致的。
Things took an even more absurd turn later that day. Trump announced he was suspending “Project Freedom”, his plan for the US Navy to escort tankers out of the strait, after just one day. The US president cited “great progress” toward an agreement with Iran. As has happened several times now, global stock markets rallied before falling back again.
当天晚些时候，局势变得更加荒谬。特朗普宣布暂停“自由计划”，即美国海军护送油轮通过海峡的计划，仅仅一天之后。美国总统援引“与伊朗取得巨大进展”作为理由。正如此前多次发生的那样，全球股市在反弹后又再次下跌。
While few doubt Trump is desperate to put this disastrous war behind him, particularly before heading to Beijing on May 14, he massively oversold the impression of a breakthrough. The Iranians were merely considering a 14-point proposal for 30 days of negotiations aimed at finding a durable end to the war.
虽然很少有人怀疑特朗普急于将这场灾难性的战争抛诸脑后，尤其是在5月14日前往北京之前，但他极大地夸大了取得突破的印象。伊朗人只是考虑了一个旨在为战争找到持久终结的为期30天的谈判的14点提案。
The more convincing reason Trump abandoned Project Freedom is that it was already clear it would not solve the crisis. Most owners of the 1,500 ships currently stranded behind the strait were unwilling to risk passage even with a naval escort. Iran’s response, attacking shipping and launching missiles at the United Arab Emirates, also threatened the ceasefire itself.
特朗普放弃“自由计划”更令人信服的原因是，它本来就不可能解决危机。目前滞留在海峡后方的1500艘船只的所有船主都不愿意冒任何风险通过，即使有海军护送。伊朗对阿联酋的攻击，以及发射导弹的行为，也威胁到了停火本身。
Washington’s problem is that the Iranians will probably insist talks can only begin, and the Strait of Hormuz reopen, if Trump agrees to end the economic blockade of Iranian maritime trade. The US blockade is inflicting serious damage on the Iranian economy.
华盛顿的问题在于，伊朗人可能会坚持认为，只有特朗普同意解除对伊朗海运贸易的经济封锁，谈判才能开始，霍尔木兹海峡才能重新开放。美国的封锁正在对伊朗经济造成严重损害。
Apart from anything else, Iranian officials see ending the blockade as logical reciprocity. But they also understand time is running out before the closure of the strait causes lasting structural damage to the global economy – if it has not already. This gives them enhanced leverage at the moment.
除了其他任何事情，伊朗官员都认为解除封锁是合乎逻辑的对等报复。但他们也明白，时间正在流逝，如果海峡关闭，将对全球经济造成持久的结构性损害——如果尚未造成的话。这让他们目前拥有了增强的筹码。
Yet even if negotiations begin, the same problem that prevented a deal before the war remains. Trump lacks the detailed and institutionalised policy apparatus of his predecessor, Barack Obama, whose 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran the current US president so desperately wants to outdo. Obama’s deal took 20 months of intense wrangling to complete. Trump has neither the patience, technical expertise or direct diplomatic connections to achieve the same.
然而，即使谈判开始，阻止战争前达成协议的同样问题依然存在。特朗普缺乏其前任巴拉克·奥巴马那种详细和制度化的政策机制，而奥巴马在2015年与伊朗达成的核协议正是当前美国总统极力想要超越的。奥巴马的协议耗时20个月的激烈周旋才完成的。特朗普既没有耐心，也没有技术专长或直接的外交联系来实现同样的目标。
Added to this are new conditions created by the war itself. The fragmentation of Iran’s decision-making process and the empowerment of elites with an even higher tolerance for military and economic pressure have introduced uncertainty into the equation. And Iran has now realised the increased leverage it has through its ability to close a critical artery of the global economy.
此外，战争本身也创造了新的条件。伊朗决策过程的碎片化，以及精英阶层对军事和经济压力的容忍度提高，给局势带来了不确定性。而伊朗现在已经意识到，它通过关闭全球经济的关键动脉所获得的筹码的增加。
Colossal failure
巨大的失败
The answer on the nuclear issue may lie in a fudge. Iran could well agree to a moratorium on uranium enrichment while not yet agreeing to ship out or dilute its enriched uranium – though without ruling that out in order to prolong negotiations.
关于核问题，答案可能在于一种折中。伊朗完全可以同意暂停铀浓缩，同时还不同意运走或稀释其浓缩铀——尽管这不能排除为了延长谈判而采取的策略。
If slightly more moderate heads in Tehran prevail – and that remains a very big if – it would be an obvious concession to make. Iran’s geographic advantages and ballistic missile capabilities have established a credible deterrent against future attack.
如果德黑兰出现稍微温和一些的领导层——而这本身就是一个巨大的“如果”——那么这将是一个显而易见的让步。伊朗的地理优势和弹道导弹能力已经建立起抵御未来攻击的可信威慑。
The question is whether anything short of total surrender on the nuclear issue is acceptable to Trump, and whether he is willing to resist inevitable Israeli opposition to blurring this red line. If not, he has already threatened to resume bombing at a “much higher intensity” than before.
问题在于，特朗普是否接受在核问题上不彻底投降的任何方案，以及他是否愿意抵抗以色列对模糊这条红线的必然反对。如果不能，他已经威胁要恢复比以前“高得多的强度”的轰炸。
Yet there are serious doubts about whether he has the stomach for this. And even if he does, it is difficult to see how any amount of US and Israeli bombing can force the Iranian regime to surrender.
然而，人们对他是否有这个胆量持严重怀疑。即使他有，也很难看出任何程度的美国和以色列的轰炸如何能迫使伊朗政权投降。
Trump’s shifting aims for the war and desperate scramble for an exit underscore that this entire enterprise has been a colossal strategic failure. It will define his legacy, reshape the Middle East and impose further misery on the Iranian people – the very opposite of what he has repeatedly said he wants to do.
特朗普在战争中不断变化的意图和绝望地寻求退出的举动，凸显了整个行动是一场巨大的战略失败。这将定义他的历史，重塑中东，并给伊朗人民带来更多的苦难——这与他反复声称想要做的事情完全相反。
The war has has shattered confidence among US regional allies that Washington can protect them. It has also alienated traditional US allies who were blamed and then punished for failing to solve a problem they neither created nor could resolve. The US and Israeli attacks have further entrenched a brutal regime that will now be even harder to negotiate with, while completely marginalising moderate voices inside Iran.
这场战争已经打破了美国地区盟友们对华盛顿能够保护他们的信心。它也疏远了传统的美国盟友，这些盟友因为未能解决一个他们既没有制造也无法解决的问题而被指责并惩罚。美以的攻击进一步巩固了一个残暴的政权，这个政权现在将更难进行谈判，同时完全边缘化了伊朗内部的温和声音。
If negotiations can prevail, the successes the US president and his advisers trumpet – the destruction of parts of Iran’s military-industrial capacity and navy – are real. Though in the former case probably only temporary and in the latter, demonstrably not critical for maintaining freedom of navigation.
如果谈判能够成功，美国总统及其顾问所吹嘘的成功——破坏了伊朗军事工业能力和海军的部分部分——是真实的。尽管在前者的情况下可能只是暂时的，而在后者的情况下，显然并非维持航行自由的关键。
The only positive is that Trump’s brief experiment with military adventurism, an aberration even within his own muddled political trajectory, may now be ending.
唯一积极的方面是，特朗普短暂的军事冒险主义实验，即使在他自己混乱的政治轨迹中也是一个异常现象，现在可能正在结束。
Christian Emery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
克里斯蒂安·埃梅里不为任何从本文中受益的公司或组织工作、咨询、拥有股份或接受资金，并且除了其学术任命外，没有披露任何相关的隶属关系。
