Các ngành tiếp xúc nhiều nhất với AI không chỉ chứng kiến năng suất tăng mà việc làm và tiền lương cũng tăng theo

Forecasts of the impact of artificial intelligence range from the apocalyptic to the utopian. An October 2025 report from Senate Democrats, for example, predicted AI will destroy millions of U.S. jobs. A couple of years earlier, consultant company McKinsey forecast AI will add trillions to the global economy, while emphasizing job losses can be mitigated by training workers to do new things.

The problem is that many of these claims are based on projections, overly simplified surveys or thought experiments rather than observed changes in the economy. That makes it hard for the public, and often policymakers, to know what to trust.

As a labor economist who studies how technology and organizational change affect productivity and well–being, I believe a better place to start is with actual data on output, employment and wages – which are all looking relatively more hopeful.

AI and jobs

In one of my new research papers with economist Andrew Johnston, we studied how exposure to generative AI affected industries across America between 2017 and 2024, using administrative data that covers nearly all employers. Our analysis covered a crucial period when generative AI use exploded, allowing us to analyze the effect within businesses and industries.

We measured AI exposure using occupation–level task data matched to each industry and state’s occupational workforce mix prior to the pandemic. A state and industry with more workers in roles requiring language processing, coding or data tasks scored higher on exposure, for example, compared with one with more plumbers and electricians.

We then took that exposure ranking by occupation and looked at changes in the standard deviation in occupational exposure, comparing that with labor market and GDP across states and industries from 2017 to 2024.

Think of a standard deviation as roughly the gap between a paramedic – whose work centers on physical assessment, emergency response and hands–on care that AI cannot easily replicate – and a public relations manager, whose work involves drafting communications, analyzing sentiment and synthesizing information that AI tools handle well. That gap in AI exposure is roughly what we’re measuring when we ask: Does being on the higher–exposure side of that divide change your industry’s trajectory?

This data allowed us to answer two questions: When AI tools became widely available following the public release of ChatGPT in late 2022, did states and industries that were more exposed to generative AI become more productive, and what happened to workers?

Our answers are more encouraging, and more nuanced, than much of the public debate suggests.

We found that industries in states that were more exposed to AI experienced faster productivity growth beginning in 2021 – before ChatGPT reached the public – driven by enterprise tools already embedded in professional workflows, including GitHub Copilot for software development, Jasper for marketing and content writing, and Microsoft’s GPT-3-powered business applications. In 2024, for example, industries whose AI exposure was one standard deviation higher saw gains of 10% in productivity, 3.9% in jobs and 4.8% in wages than comparable industries in the same state.

Those patterns suggest that, at least so far, AI has acted as a productivity-enhancing tool that boosts employment and wages rather than a simple substitute for labor.

Augmentation versus displacement

A crucial distinction in the data is between tasks where AI works with people and tasks where AI can act more independently. In sectors where AI mainly complements workers – think marketing, writing or financial analysis – our data show that employment rose by about 3.6% per standard deviation increase in exposure.

In sectors where AI can execute tasks more autonomously – including basic data processing, generating boilerplate code, or handling standardized customer interactions – we found no significant employment change, though workers in those roles saw slower wage growth.

What these findings suggest is that when AI lowers the cost of completing a task and raises worker productivity, companies expand output enough to increase their demand for labor overall — the same logic that explains why power tools didn’t eliminate construction workers.

The economic question is not whether any given task disappears. It is whether businesses and workers can reorganize fast enough to create new productive combinations. And so far, in most sectors, our evidence suggests they can.

But state policies also matter: These benefits were concentrated in the states with more efficient labor markets, meaning that the impact of generative AI on workers and the economy also depends on the types of policies and institutions of the local economy.

Importantly, these findings hold beyond occupational exposure. In additional work with co-authors at the Bureau of Economic Analysis, we found a similar effect on GDP and employment when looking at actual AI utilization — that is how often workers use AI. Drawing on the Gallup Workforce Panel, we measured workers actively using AI daily or multiple times a week. We found that each percentage–point increase in the share of frequent AI users in a state and industry is associated with roughly 0.1% to 0.2% higher real output and 0.2% to 0.4% higher employment.

To put that in context: The share of frequent AI users across all occupations rose from about 12% in mid-2024 to 26% by late 2025, a shift our estimates suggest corresponds to roughly 1.4% to 2.8% higher real output – or about 1 to 2 percentage points of annualized growth over that period.

New technologies rarely leave work untouched. But they also rarely eliminate the need for human contribution altogether. Instead, they change the composition of work, as our research shows. Some tasks shrink. Others expand. New ones emerge that were previously too costly or too hard to perform at scale. Put simply, some occupations might go away, but most of them just change.

If anything, the trends documented here are likely to strengthen rather than fade. Not only are generative AI tools rapidly improving, but also the experimentation and research and development that many workers and companies are engaging in are likely to pay large dividends. These investments – often referred to as intangible capital – tend to get unlocked a few years after a technology comes onto the scene, once complementary investments have been made.

The role of companies and managers

Whether AI leads to anxiety or adaptation for workers depends in part on what happens inside organizations. Using additional data collected over many years in the Gallup Workforce Panel covering more than 30,000 U.S. employees from 2023 to 2026, I found in a 2026 paper that workplace adoption of generative AI rose quickly over the period, with the share of workers using AI often increasing from 9% to 26%.

But the more important finding is that adoption was far more common where workers believed their organization had communicated a clear AI strategy and where employees said they trust leadership. This suggests that growing adoption and effective use of AI depends not only on the availability of the technology but on whether managers make its use clear, credible and safe.

Where that clarity exists, frequent AI use is associated with higher engagement and job satisfaction, and it even reverses the burnout penalties that appear elsewhere.

In other words, the broader economic effects of AI depend not only on how sophisticated the tools are but on whether companies and managers create environments where workers can experiment, reorganize tasks and integrate new tools into productive routines. That is, if employees do not feel the psychological safety to experiment, they are less likely to use AI, and they are especially less likely to use it for higher–value work.

That is precisely the kind of adaptation that I believe makes labor markets more resilient than the most alarmist forecasts suggest.

Christos Makridis is a senior researcher at Gallup.